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JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN AND SOUTH AFRICA
The most remarkable feature of Joseph Chamberlains
government of the Empire was his attempt to command assent
at home and abroad. At home he was extraordinarily success-
ful. His complicity in the Jameson Raxd and his respon-
sibility for the long, expensive and no more than marginally
successful war with the South African republics made that
achievement only the more remarkable. But abroad, par-
ticularly in South Africa, success eluded him. That lack
of success raised questions about the worth of his whole
imperial enterprise, questions to which most people now,
historians and laymen ^like, would give the same negative
answer. Conscious- of the risk of failure though equally
confident of the possibility of success, Chamberlain con-
centrated his final energies on an attempt to harness-
domestic and colonial economic self-interest to the chariot
of the Empire, This time success eluded him at home,
though he might have been able to turn the tide there
if fate had allowed him the same vigorous old age that
Gladstone and later Churchill enjoyed.. But this part of
Chamberlain's story lies outside my concern in this essay.
What I want to suggest here is the liberal as well as
authoritarian character of his leadership of the Empire
particularly in South Africa during his tenure as Colonial
Secretary.
The seminal year in Chamberlain's mid-life occurred
between the autumn of 1887 and the spring of 1888. In
August 1887, he found himself almost alone in the political
wilderness, cut off from the bulk of the Liberal party
by his opposition to Irish Home Rule, cut off from his
main Conservative ally, Lord Randolph Churchill, by Church-
ill's impossible temperament, and close to despair at
the essentially negative policies not only of the Conser-
vative Government under Lord Salisbury but also of the
Liberal Unionist leader, Lord Hartington. When Salisbury
asked him to head a British delegation to try and resolve
a vexed controversy between Canada and the United States
over the north Atla ntic fisheries, Chamberlain seized
the opportunity for at least temporary escape..
In the winter of 1887/8, he found his footing
personally as well as politically. His encounters in the
new world convinced him of the superiority of the old.
Canada and, by wa y of contrast, the United States impressed
him with the talent of the British for strong, imperial
leadership of far-flung peoples.. The chilly personal
isolation that he had often felt in England outside Bir-
mingha m was replaced by warm hospitality in Washington,
which embraced him as the lion of its social season.
His diplomatic mission was crowned with substantial success.
He grafted the entire experience to himself by falling
in love and winning the love of a young Bostonian Brahmin,
Mary Peabody Endicott, daughter of President Cleveland's
Secretary of the Army. She anchored him for the rest
of his life in a happy marriage, an Anglo-Saxon imperial
marriage.
Chamberlain returned to England with a newfound
but as yet vaguely defined sense of purpose. To some
extent under his prodding, the domestic policy of the
Conservative government had taken a substantially construc-
tive turn with the introduction of an epoch making Local
Government bill. Without neglecting the domestic agenda,
Chamberlain gave an increased amount of his attention to
colonial and imperial issues and particularly to South
Africa.
S^uth Africa had already concerned him for almost
a decade. Before he joined Gladstone's cabinet in 1880,,
he had taken notable part in the chorus of Liberal critics
of the Zulu war.. He argued along the familiar lines laid
down by John Bright and Gladstone:: "'... we have," he
declared, "undertaken illimitable obligations and respon-
sibilities, and ... are warring everywhere against justice
and freedom, against the inevitable and righteous course
of events." (The Times, 17 April 1879); He gave hisp argu-
ment an imperial twist r. the policy of Disraeli's govern-
ment was weak as well as wicked, it had "neither advanced
British interests nor maintained British honour." After
the general election, because of Chamberlain's interest,
Gladstone asked him to answer questions on South African
subjects for the new government in the House of Commons.
Chamberlain reacted impatiently to the hesitation
of the cabinet to give the Transvaal back to the Boers-
He welcomed the decision to do so after the British defeat
at Majuba hill, not, however, he later, insisted, because
of Britain's military weakness. He accepted assurances
from the army that Britain could avenge the defeat. He
welcomed the restoration of the Transvaal to the Boers
as a matter of ethical responsibility.
Kruger!"s chafing at the restraints of the Pretoria
Convention of 1881, which established the independence
of the South African Republic though under British suzer-
ainty, awakened doubts in Chamberlain. His doubts found
initially ethical outlets. He became friendly with F.W.
Chesson of the Aborgines Protection Society. More momen-
tously, his friend, R.W. Dale, the leading Congrenation-
alist minister in Birmingham, introduced him to the .
misaionary-cum-imperial agent from. STouth Africa, John
Mackenzie, who latched onto Chamberlain eagerly. The
government tried to remove the grounds for Kruger1s irri-
tation at the Pretoria Convention by watering it down in
the London Convention of 1884. The ink on this agreement
was scarclj dry when Kruger began to chafe against it too.
His behaviour completed the discredit, in Chamberlain's
eyes, of the policy of kindly accomodation that had dictated
both conventions. But the furour generated over his own
"unauthorized programme" for domestic reform and then over
Ireland drove South Africa to the back of his mind from
1885 to 1888,
It came forward again as soon as he returned
from Washington. Mackenzie, ever importunate, approached
him at this ripe moment, asking him to preside at a meeting
of the London Chamber of Gommerce that Mackenzie was: to
address. Chamberlain took his time before accepting the
invitation in order to mull over the subject of South
Africa and the issues that it raised. He tried his ideas
out against well informed but critical opinion around
the privacy of a dinner table. Three men joined him.
One, Lord Derby, had been Colonial Secretary when Britain
accomodated Kruger through the London Convention, and
was, ns Chamberlain explained to Mary Endicotit, an advocate
of scuttling out of embarra ssing imperial obligations..
The other two men, the English historian James Anthony
Froude and the South African jurist Sir J.H. de Yilliers,
wanted to leave the initiative and responsibility in South
Africa to the elected colonial government at the Cape.
Strengthened in his thinking by their friendly argument
with him, CThamberlain accepted Mackenzie's invitation.
Chamberlain used his position as chairman of
Mackenzie's meeting to present his own ideas, (The Times,
15 May 1888), developed as they had been by events in
South Africa as well as by his own experience. He was
fully alive to the significance of the recent discovery
of gold on the Rand. That F°l<i? he knew, was "as certain
as destiny" to attract "European enterprise and European
colonization." As a screw manufacturer in the 1860s and
•70s, he also knew the importance to British industry of
enterprise overseas. His firm, Nettlefold and Chamberlain,
had owed its ascendancy in good part to its conquest of
foreign markets, a conquest that had been his particular
responsibility. The richest fields in that conquest had
laid in Europe::, but the depression that had fallen on
British metal manufacturing industry since he had left
the business, and the opportunities that he had recently
sensed in Canada as well as South Africa, excited his
economic imagination and concentrated his focus on the
Empire. "Is there a man in his senses," he asked the
meeting, "who believes that the crowded population of
these islands would exist for a single day if we were to
cut adrift from the great dependencies which now look to
us for protection and assistance?11"
He wedded Britain's economic interest to his
earlier insistence on Britain's responsibility for the
protection of native peoples in a way that subordinated
the second to the first. Disregard for the well-being
of natives had discredited imperial expansion in the past,
he said; a more humane'policy would avoid that discredit.
Then he took a leap. As he reckoned it, the addition of
imperial responsibilities and imperial economic interests
amounted to more than a simple sum. It amounted, he de-
clared ^amid ringing cheers, to the question, "who is
to be the dominant power in South Africa?"' Having carried
his audience with him that far, he pushed them onto con-
troversial ground. With de Villiers sitting in front of
him, he took issue with those who advocated placing respon-
sibility in local colonial rather than in central imperial
hands: "... if we are once for all to recognize our obli-
gations--in regard to this great continent," he insisted,
"we must do so in pursuance of an Imperial policy and not
of a colonial policy if in any respect that differs from
ours."
For the next fifteen years,. Chamberlain sought
to reconcile the often competing demands of Cape Town and
London. He met sometimes with spectacular failure, some-
times with "hard earned, fleeting success. He experimented
with a variety of devices. In doing so, he kept three
prorotypes in mind. Two, Birmingham and Canada, kindled
his imagination; but the third, Gladstone's scheme for
Ireland that come to be known as Home Rule, alarmed him.
The difference was not a matter of local powers of initia-
tive but of imperial powers of superintendence. Birmingham
had more power over the social, cultural and economic life
of its citizens than some nation states exercised. But
it secured those powers from Farliament. Chamberlain as
mayor had worked closely with the Home Secretary, Sir
Richard Cross, in framing and using parliamentary iegisla-
tion to meet Birmingham's needs, even though the two men
belonged to opposing political parties. There was a some-
what similar distribution of power in Canada. While the
provincial governments, particularly of Quebec and Ontario,
exercised a good deal of power for the benefit of their
different "races" (as Chamberlain used the word), the
federal government could disallow their legislation, and
also possessed a wide range of responsibilities of its
own. The fatal flaw in Gladstone's Irish proposals, on
the other hand, as Chamberlain saw it, was the limited
title th^t they left to the imperial Parliament to act
for the kingdom as a whole.
(Tape colony had its own elected legislature,
with an executive responsible to it, under loose, often
diffident supervision by the imperial high commissioner.
There was too much Home Rule colouring for Chamberlain's
taste in this arrangement. He certainly did not want to
see any aggra ndisement of the Cape through annexations
to it of further territory to the north. "We have gone
ahead at a great rate in giving Home Rule to the Cape,"
he observed to the Conservative Colonial Secretary, Lord
Knutsford, in October 1888, "but there is no .earthly-
reason for disposing prematurely of the future of the whole
of South Africa." Cecil Rhodes1 Chartered Company offered
an alternative arrangement of imperial and colonial inter-
ests for economic development to the north. Chamberlain
was uneasy about this arrangement too. Although the charter
was an expression of imperial authority, Rhodes acquired
his own colonial power as prime minister at the Cape,
and his personal wealth rivalled the financial resources
that the imperial government could put behind his enterprise.
Chamberlain reconciled himself to the experiment by indu-
cing Lord Grey as his friend and fellow advocate of imper-
ial supremacy to accept a directorship in the company.
The precaution was woefully inadequate,.
The confusion of authority in the arrangements
of the Chartered Company created quicksands into which
Chamberlain stepped at the outset of his career as Colo-
nial Secretary. The Jameson Raid was an event that needs
to be looked at from many angles. As an episode in Chamber-
lain's career, it was a doubly paradoxical failure. He
was usually acutely sensitive to popular opinion, yet he
failed to foresee the impact that the Raid might have on
public opinion in the Cape, a topic to which I will turn
later. He was also an advocate of firm leadership by the
imperial authorities, yet he failed either to supervise
or to steer clear of a critical situation on the borders
of the Empire. ^
Every cache of letters that surfaces to throw
light on the Jameson Raid reduces the doubt about Chamber-
lain's complicity in it. As lord Grey put it (on 12 June
1896) to Rhodes' solicitor, Bouchier Hawksley, Chamberlain
"was led to believe that the inevitable Revolution /at
Johannesburg was about to take place, & he very properly
took precautions to ensure its success when it came about."
Grey put it this way to exonerate Chamberlain, but the
defence does not hold up under examination. Chamberlain
cannot be condemned for his ignorance of the extent to
which Rhodes was organizing the "Revolution" on the Rand;
but Chamberlain certainly did not take either proper or
adequate precautions about the force that would ride in
to support the revolutionaries. Jameson1s force ought
to have been under the ultimate command, not of Rhodes,,
but of the high commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson.
To make that arrangement work, however, Robinson ought
to have been Lord Loch—as Chamberlain had desired when
Robinson was appointed. Robinson was a very sick man,
and weak. Assuming that Chamberlain and Rhodes were con-
spiring over his head, he simply plugged his ears, leaving
Rhodes and Jameson without surveillance and Chamberlain
without an independent channel of information. The indict-
ment against Chamberlain over the Jameson Raid is that
he failed to control the disjointed machinery willed to
him "by the preceding Liberal government.
The subsequent committee of enquiry into the
Raid was quite a different story. There was no lack of
control on Chamberlain's part in this case. The indictment
against him here is simple:: he lied to the House of Commons
and to the country "by denying his complicity in the Raid,
Although that has become the more shocking of the two
indictments, it did not seem so at the time to most of
those who knew or guessed the truth. Until the enquiry
was over, even Chamberlain's bitterest political opponents
in Britain bridled their tongues. Those who spoke out,
like the idiosyncratic moralist W.T. Stead, were extra-
ordinarily rare. Chamberlain's conduct was approved or
tolerated by his colleagues, who knew a great deal, by
his staff at the Colonial Office who knew everything, and
by the great majority in the Commons and, more passively,
in the country, who knew enough to be suspicious. This
reaction is a commentary less on the morality of the age
than on the national solidarity. Salisbury had lied to
the House of Lords in 1878 when an accurate outline of one
of the agreements that paved the way for the Congress of
Berlin was leaked to the press. Lord Selborne, his son-
in-law and fellow high churchman, was as implicated in the
Raid as Chamberlain, and lied about it even more blandly.
The Commons and the country were prepared, like Nelson
at Trafalgar, to turn a blind eye to Chamberlain!'s com-
plicity in the Raid because the imperial reputation and
international interests of the nation were at stake.
Still, he would not have survived politically
without breathtaking, brutal audacity during the months
of enquiry. For a year and a half he fought, through
fluctuations of alarm, to protect himself and the country
from the consequences of the Raid. The threat of exposure
was too acute to allow anything like settled policy toward
South Africa to emerge from his twists during this time.
But some of the devices that he used and decisions that
he reached proved lasting.
He discovered new worth in bipartisan consensus.
He would not have been, safe without a wide measure of
bipartisan agreement in the parliamentary committee of
enquiry on the Raid to focus attention on concerns other
than his suspected complicity. Though he used these con-
cerns to divert attention from himself, he genuinely shared
them to one degree or another. Sir William Harcourt, leader
of the Liberal party in the Commons and also in effect
of the enquiry, was preoccupied by the strain in Anglo-..
American relations over Venezuela. The interest of Cham-
berlain as well as Harcourt in the United States was deep-
ened by their American wives, an affinity that Harcourt
enjoyed; and Chamberlain ultimately took the lead for
the government in resolving the dispute.
In so far as South Africa was concerned, Harcourt
directed his anger at Rhodes, So, more passionately,
did Labouchere, the firebrand on the committee of enquiry.
The diversion of Labouchere•s attention away from Chamber-
lain was surprising, for Labouchere had once hopoed that
Chamberlain would become Britain's first Radical prime
minister, and ever since Chamberlain's defection from the
Liberal party over Home Rule, Labouchere had attacked
him with all the venom of a rejected lover. Chamberlain
shared Harcourt's and Labouchere's distrust of Rhodes,
though within much more confined limits. Rhodes1 attempt
to blackmail him over the Raid hardened this distrust,
and also won Chamberlain some sympathy from the two Liberals.
The fiasco of the Raid enabled Chamberlain to reduce the
Chartered Company to the subservience he had originally
desired. While Rhodes preserved its economic mandater
Chamberlain stripped down its political powers.
He collaborated with Harcourt so successfully
over the parliamentary enquiry that he tried to repeat
his success with Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerraan during the
run-up to the Boer War in the summer of 1899* But the
collaboration with Harcourt had destroyed Harcourtfs cre-
dibility as party leader. Campbell-Bannerman had taken
over the position that Harcourt lost, and he appreciated
the reason for his rise. He too had been a member of the
committee of enquiry, and though he had maintained a lower
profile on it, he could not exploit this particular vul-
nerability in Chamberlain. But he maintained a stance
of critical detachment toward Chamberlain, and resisted
his attempts to secure official Liberal approval for
a precautionary military build-up in South Africa.
The fires of the enquiry tempered Chamberlain's
steel. The Raid had exposed his rough edges. They con-
tinued to show in his forays into foreign affairs. But
in his own sphere at the Colonial Office he emerged with
an increasingly sure imperial touch. His performance as
Secretary of State from the autumn of 1897 until the spring
of 1903 commanded recurrent, often massive respect from
contemporaries..
Chamberlain is remembered as a hard man, mani-
pulative and ruthless. Conteirvporariesjsaw him aa: emotional!
and impulsive, a man of fierce loves and fierce hates,
very loyal to his friends—though only up to a point, for
if they parted from him, he reacted with intense bitterness
that only time might mellow. "As temperamental as a school-
girl and implacable as Juno" is how Salisbury described
him, selecting feminine comparisons.. That temperament
had not been brought under control in Gladstone's minis-
tries, with fateful consequences. The tearing apart of
the Liberal party in 1886 had less to do with Ireland than
with violation of the bonds of loyalty between leaders
and followers in England;; and Chamberlain was the lightning
rod through which the fiercest of those emotions surged.
8The nineteen months of suppressed fear that he endured
after the Jameson Raid taught him some long lasting re-
straints.. For the next six years he held himself in re-
markable control. Sparks flew whenever he was verbally
attacked, as so frequently happened, and he was very sen-
sitive to aspersions upon his honour. But that sensitivity
had something to do with his industrial origins and brief
formal schooling in comparison to the landed wealth and
Oxford or Cambridge education in which most of Britain's
governing elite still gloried. The sparks that shot from
him Jin debate came from the striking of steel against; still
harder steel.
Behind his fierce energy lay a will to create-
The business of consolidating an empire required that kind
of will. Hard work was not enough. It took a rare will
to avoid bogging down in the administrative detail of an
empire that covered half the earth,, leaving initiative
in the hands of the pro-consuls on the spot. Empire
building called for creativity as Chamberlain had learned
in early manhood on a small scale when he helped to mono-
polize the British screw-making industry. His early small
and later large enterprises showed much in common: bold
imagination, careful attention to costs—Hicks Beach at
the Exchequer and Chamberlain at the Colonial Office talked
much the same language—sensitivity to the work force,
and relentless absorption of competitors. Empire building
called for creativity in a way that was not true of the
conduct of international affairs. There, certainly for
a satisfied power that could not hope for much further
foreign expansion, the premium was on the arts of preser-
vation, on shrewd analysis and patient diplomacy, skills
of which Lord Salisbury was master. He and Chamberlain
worked out a mature, mutually dependent, and extraordi-
narily successful partnership. They became in effect the
twin consuls governing Britain. The deference with which
they treated each other gracefully expressed their mutual
restraint. When Salisbury eventually retired, the quality
that Chamberlain and his wife singled out in their letters
of appreciation to him was his loyalty to Chamberlain,
loyalty at a particularly difficult time—during the after-
math to the Jameson Raid.
While that experience showed Chamberlain the
bedrock reliability of his fellow consul, the Raid itself
taught him the need for a frank, cordial, collegial rela-
tionship with his pro-consuls in the major spheres of the
Empire, above all in South Africa. Rhodes gave him an
unforgettable lesson in the dangers of an indirect or para-
llel relationship between Secretary of State and the pos-
sessor of the primary imperial mandate on the spot.
Robinson served Chamberlain acceptably for an interlude
after the Raid. In spite of some sharp differences on
policy, the two men clung to each other to protect their
individual reputations. It served Chamberlain1s purposes
even to publish evidence of Robinson's occasional refusal
to do as Chamberlain bid him: that helped to suggest the
limitations to Chamberlain's responsibility for what went
on in South Africa before as well as after"the Raid. Still,
Robinson served merely as a temporary expedient. He and
Chamberlain did not naturally see eye to eye, and in any
case he was dying.
Sir Alfred Milner, whom Chamberlain selected!
as high commissioner after a prlonged search, did not turn
out to be quite what Chamberlain expected. As soon as the
Anglo-Boer War was over, after five years of working to-
gether through seemingly much more difficult times, the
relationship between the two men broke down, and it never
really recovered. Milner almost certainly would have
resigned in 1903 if Chamberlain, for different reasons,
had not done so first. Nevertheless, the relationship
served Chamberlain remarkably well. Nothing is more notable
during the times of strain when Chamberlain was over-
riding Milner than Chamberlain's urging of him to stay
in office.
The two men brought to their respective assign-
ments, and they valued in each other, the same quality
of bold as well as assiduous enterprise that was indispen-
sable to the task of building up the Empire. Both were
men of strong conviction, an affinity that would have led
to a clash long before it did. if they had not shared most
of the same convictions and also had not recognized the
paramountcy of each other in their respective spheres-
Even when he raised questions about the course that Milner
proposed to pursue, Chamberlain deferred to his assessment
of the situation on the spot and appreciated his need for
tactical freedom of manoeuvre. Milner similarly appreciated
the over-riding need of Chamberlain back in England to
carry the cabinet, Parliament and the country with him.
The relationship between the two men needed fall of this
temperamental affinity, agreement, and mutual recognition
of spheres of -primacy, in order to endure through five
extraordinarily searching years.
They fell apart only with the advent of peace.
At one level, their falling out was over their functional
conduct. Trying to define their proper relationship,
Chamberlain compared it to that of fellow members of the
cabinet, "namely, that there should be absolute frankness
in our private relations & full discussion of all matters
of common interest, and that the decisions finally arrived
at should be loyally supported & considered as the decisions
of the whole of the Government or of the parties concerned
in the discussion." (Chamberlain to Milner, 24 July 1902X
Milner had violated these canons? by publicizing his demand
for suspension of the Cape constitution in spite of Cham-
berlain' s repeated refusal to agree. But Chamberlain* s
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analogy to the cabinet was meant to flatter and was not
quite candid. He did not regard Milner as a fellow col-
league but ultimately as a subordinate, though an immensely
important and trusted one.
The heart of their disagreement was not functional
but political;: and it revealed the tempering of Chamberlain's
imperialism that had taken place since the Jameson Raid..
In spite of all his thrusting, manipulation and venom
as a politician, he had a fine sense about the aspirations,
the commitments and the boundaries to the tolerance of
the large groups of people who collectively forced the
public. He was by nature and conviction an authoritarian
democrat, authoritarian being the adjective, democrat the
noun. That balance was evident from the outset of his
political career, not least in the National Liberal Fede-
ration that he created. Critics derided it as a cheering
section to applaud Chamberlain's decisions.. But in fact-
he spoke in its name so authoritatively because he listened
to its first and second echelons so attentively. He was
as good a listener as a speaker. He always gave a vigo-
rous lead, but then he listened with surprising objecti-
vity to the response. He knew, furthermore, that public
response was never monolithic, that it varied from place
to place in Birmingham, in the West Midlands, in England,
and in the United Kingdom. The art of leading and liste-
ning to the British public was a complex one.
Much more so the art of leading and listening
to the Empire.. Chamberlain had a little early experience
of this"as spokesman for the Liberal government on South
African affairs in the House of Commons during the early
18.80s, when visitors from the Cape began to seek him out.
But his formative experience as an imperial spokesman came
during the Washington fisheries negotiations in 1887/88»
In Canada during the Christmas recess, he learned a little
about dealing with a colonial cabinet. In Toronto, where
he spoke out against commercial union with the United
States and sketched out his burgeoning imperial vision,
he brought his audience cheering to their feet. Some
actually wept for joy. Others jumped onto the tables,
waved their napkins, and shouted themselves hoarse. This
response galvanized his belief in Britain's talent, even
mission, for imperial government, a talent that Canada
demonstrated within its own borders through its confederate
constitution and the cooperation of French and English.
This belief received powerful reinforcement in
the United States. Chamberlain's observations, sharpened
by the gloomy commentary of Henry Adams and his circle
into which Mary Endicott drew him, led him to a number
of conclusions. He again saw what he took to be the Anglo-
Saxon talent for drawing different peoples into a common
polity. But he was more struck by the spinelessness of
American political leadership, by the timorous way in
which president and congress felt out the contours of public
opinion in fear and trembling. Chamberlain's reaction
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strengthened his natural predilection toward a much more
assertive style of democratic leadership. It was, by the
way, the same style that he used to win Mary's hand. It
could be called imperial courtship* It required the leader
to begin by taking a strong stand, and then carefully to
observe the response,, willing to modify, though rarely to
abandon, his stance in order to ensure that his lead was
followed.
For the most natural of reasons, Chamberlain
did not concern himself much with the texture of public
opinion in the Empire till after the Jameson Raid. Once
the general election in July of 1895 was behind him, he
spent August grasping the main threads of administrative
concern in the Colonial Office. After a much needed holiday
he returned to these administrative concerns, settling
the controversy between Rhodes and the Bechuana chiefs
in a way that put Jameson quickly in position to invade
the South African Republic in the event of the uprising
expected at Johannesburg. It was in November that Rhodes
and Chamberlain reached the ill defined agreement that
led to the Raid. Chamberlain's only significant involve-
ment with matters of public opinion during these months
had to do with the amount of discontent in Johannesburg
which he, in common with nearly everyone else, overestimated.
The failure of the Raid instantly expanded his.
theatre of concern from Downing Street to the public arenas
at home and in South Africa. From January of 1896 until
June of 1903i when he launched his tariff reform crusade,
he kept both of these arenas continually under observation.
His immediate objective was to prevent the passions ig-
nited by the Raid from destroying himself and his imperial
aspirations. The fires of the next eighteen months burned
a lot of impressions upon him. The failure of the Rand-
lords to match deeds to words, the quick surrender of
Jameson's men, and the blackmail of Rhodes soured his
sympathy for the English and their interests in the South
African Republic, and gave him a new appreciation of the
Afrikaners. "It makes me sick to hear our braggarts de-
preciate the Boers," he told Lord Lansdowne (9 March 1896):
"After all, they have beaten Englishmen!Ir As for the
Randlords, he cursed them as "a lot of cowardly selfish
blatant speculators who would sell their souls to have
the power of rigging the Market." (A statement of policy,
5 April 1896) Words like these make his ability on the
committee of enquiry to carry Harcourt and Labouchere with
him less surprising. Yet ye waa willing at the same time
to make use of the "braggarts." "I do not mind the noisy
exaltation of the Jingo party," he explaied to Edward
Fairfield in the Colonial Office (on April 8, 1896), "since
it does not commit me & may put pressure on the people
in the Transvaal who are afraid of war."'
Chamberlain led public oninion at home with
stunning effectiveness. Though a partisan by tenrner,
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the public response that he wanted to his leadership at
the Colonial Office was national and, if possible, bipar-
tisan. He longed to be acclaimed as a national leader,
and liked to think of Lord Salisbury's ministry as a na-
tional government. Those impressions would validate his
past conduct in splitting with Gladstone over Home Rule
and joining forces with Salisbury, and would also serve
his current needs as a Liberal Unionist in the leadership
of a government most of whose supporters were Conservative.
When Campbell-Bannerman denied him bipartisan support during
the prelude to the Boer War, Chamberlain wooed moderate
opinion on Campbell-Bannerman1s side of the House and out
of doors only the more assiduously. The imperious manner
of his courtship was no reflection on the seriousness with
which he took the object of his attentions. He subjected
the conduct of negotiations with Kruger and the pace of
military preparations in South Africa to this over-riding
concern.
Kruger1s decision to issue his ultimatum before
Chamberlain, had to issue his meant that Britain's commitment
to the war was not subjected to searching examination from
the outset. That test came with Black Week. Coolly objec-
tive at the moment of crisis, Chamberlain was not confident
of the determination to go through with the business to
the end until that week was over. The next test came
in the form of the general election in the autumn of 1900.
Chamberlain had pressed for the calling of the election
then, almost two years ahead of time, and he virtually
monopolized the Government's campaign. Yet again, in the
very thick of it, he was not totally confident of the out-
come. He paid close attention to the demeanour of the
crowds, to the passivity or rowdiness of the dissentients
at his rallies. Though he announced in an infamous phrase,
that "every vote given against the Government is a vote
given to the Boers,^he also watched how Liberal candidates
sought to divert attention from the war to other issues
and to avoid the label of "little Englanders." He read:
that evidence as proof that England's commitment to im-
perialism was still firm.
The guerrilla war that took root after the general
election opened the final but most promising chapter in
Chamberlain's dealings with South Africa. This phase of
the war,, that persisted sturdily into the spring of 1902,
is notorious for the "methods of barbarism"1' to which the
British army resorted in their attempt to stamp it out.
Though Chamberlain was not directly responsible for those
methods and signally improved conditions in the concentra-
tion camps once civilian authority took them over from the
military, they of course tarnished his imperial policy.
The guerrilla war is associated with a coarsening
of British attitudes toward the Boers. But the reverse
was in fact true of Chamberlain. The tenacity of the
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guerrillas and, still more, the resilient sympathy for them
among Afrikaner civilians gave him a new appreciation of
their ethnic fidelity. The war "became particularly virulent
in the Cape. There the conflict was a rebellion rather
than a straightforward fight between enemy states, and
the imposition of martial law over broad stretches of the
colony gave rise to a hornets' nest of injustices. The
situation in the Cape shifted the balance of Chamberlain's
concern from the Boer republics to the mother colony, upon
which he eventually focussed his talent for imperial leader-
ship. The modification in Chamberlain's response brought
him into serious conflict with Lord Milner to whom, however,
Chamberlain gave the last word by resigning as Secretary
of State for the Colonies soon after he returned from his
post-war visit to South Africa.
The conflict erupted over Milner1s demand for
suspension of the Cape constitution, which Chamberlain
rejected. He did so in the name of parliamentary and
public opinion in Britain rather that at the Cape. Milner,
using the difficulties raised by extension of martial law
over much of the Cape as his justification, wanted suspen-
sion of the constitution in order to transfer power from
the Cape Dutch to the English. He saw South African .-"-
Afrikanerdom as a two-headed monster.. One head, the inde-
pendent South African Republic, would be cut off by military
defeat and annexation; but the beast would survive so long
as its other head, Dutch dominance in the Cape, remained
in tact. Chamberlain sensed, however, that the protracted,
costly guerrilla war and the methods used to repress it
had weakened Britain's willingness to triumph in South
Africa at any cost. He tried to put the case positively
to Miner. "I continue firmly of the opinion," he wrote
(on 7 Feb. 1901X, "that there is no fear of any 'wobble1
on the part of the British public provided that our policy
is firm, clear, & consistent, and that in carrying it out
we do not raise new questions of a deeply controversial
character." To overthrow constitutionally elected govern-,
ment at the Cape, even briefly, would raise just such a
question. The bipartisan consensus, such as it was by
this tii&ef.-on South Africa would be shattered, and hence
Milner's achievement would be placed in jeopardy..
Despite Chamberlain's repeated insistence on
this point, Milner kept demanding suspension throughout the
guerrilla war and allowed his demand to become public at
its close. His action backfired. Not only did it force
Chamberlain to reject the demand with public emphasis.
The prolonged argument between the two men, and its focus
on the Cape, helped to alter the balance and character
of Chamberlain1s thinking about South Africa.
Until the end of the conventional war, he thought
of the conflict as a fairly straightforward one between
Britain and Kruger's republic. The body of South African
opinion on which he focussed was that of Kruger and his Boers.
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How determined were they to resist the determination o n
Chamberlain's side to bring South Africa sooner or later
under Britain's sway? By the spring of 1899 he was sure
that they were enemies of Britain. He was not sure until
September that they would press this enmity to the point
of war. These questions were vitally important but not
essentially complicated.
The situation to which Chamberlain paid increa-
sing attention at the Cape after the conventional war
had been won was much more vexed; and it stimulated his
resourcefulness as a democratic politician. It suggested
questions about the viability of a democratic empire.
Never doubting the answer to the basic question, he talked
about the situation at the Cape in a number of quite dif-
ferent ways. To tfilner at one point he developed a com-
parison between the Cape and Ireland with the kind of
kKHfcsdt cynicism that he had learned from Lord Salisbury.
"The worst that could happen," he wrote (on 24 July 19C2),
"would be that ... we should have 'an Ireland in South
Africa'. That would be a most undesirable & annoying
result, but its importance should not be exaggerated.
After all, what is the situation in Ireland? We have
constant agitation ... We are hampered in the House of
Commons ... however, the annoyance ... does not constitute
any real danger. Ve have always been told that England's
difficulty would be Ireland's opportunity. Veil, we have
been in the greatest difficulty that we have had to face
during a century ... and yet Ireland has been perfectly
quiet. ... as long as the physical force is under our
control British rule will be firmly established and nothing
can touch our more important interests." Later, with
King Edward VII, he tried a different argument. All along,
British policy had been based on two assumptions:: first,
that the Transvaal was of central importance to control
of South Africa, and second, that the majority of its
population was or would soon be English. If so, then
the Cape, however disaffected, could be kept in hand by
the Transvaal. "If the Transvaal is contented & loyal,"
he wrote from Johannesburg (on 21 Jan. 1903), "it will
matter very little what Cape Golony does or thinks, as
the prevailing sentiment will be dictated from here."
But Chamberlain was not a natural cynic, nor
did he like to think of his Empire internally in terms
of "real politik,"" He wanted to lead the Empire, to give
it a lead that would be followed. He was always ready
to prompt the following from behind the scenes, as he had
done in suggesting to the governors general of Canada and
Australia that he would welcome offers of troops to fight
in the South African War. But he wanted a cordial local
response to his promptings;; and when the prime minister
of Canada, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, dragged his feet, Chamber-
lain irritatedly acquiesced.
Until the autumn of 1900, preoccupied with the
Transvaal, Chamberlain paid only subordinate attention
to sentiment at the Cape, with disastrous results. Here
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again the story began with the damning fact of the Jameson
Raid. In the distracted discussions that led to the Raid,
Chamberlain did not think of the Cape. He left it to Rhodes,
the trusted leader of the Cape Dutch and English alike,.
In a way, that delegation of responsibility was proper..
But when the ethnic alliance at the Cape fell to pieces
after the Raid, Chamberlain neglected to see that they
were picked up, even though he recognized that the Dutch
made up the majority there. The alienation of their sym-
pathies from Britain toward the South African Republic
simply increased the importance that he placed upon asser-
ting Britain's primacy over the republic. He accepted
the ambivalence at the Cape and the neutrality of the
Schreiner ministry as unfortunate but bearable. He refused
to take issue with Miner's blunt language about the Cape
Dutch: "the passage /Tn your despatch of Hay 47 has been
severely criticised in the opposition newspapers," he told
Milner (on 7 July 1899). "Personally I am all for speaking
plainly in these matters. There comes a time when it is
dangerous to pretend to be blind, and although in quiet
years we lijce to speak of the universal loyalty of H.M.
subjects everywhere we must be aware that where there is
a mixed population race sympathy may be stronger than
devotion to British rule."'
; took the argument between the two men over
suspension of the Cape constitution "to quicken Chamber- •'
Iain's sensitivities. He poured over the pieces of infor-
mation he could glean about the varieties of sentiment
in the Cape colony. He resisted Milner's attempt to
analyse it in polarized terms, divided between loyal
English and disloyal Dutch, or between loyal Progressives
and a disloyal Bond. He vigorously encouraged the expres-
sion of Sir J.H. de Villiers1 loyalty to the Empire, He
drew attention to the Progressives1 lack of solidarity.
Yet he sensed that the less obvious or clear-cut, perhaps
less settled and hence more promising modulations of opinion
in the Cape were eluding him.
It was to hear as much as to lead local opinion
that Chamberlain travelled to South Africa at the end of
1902. From beginning to end, the Cape was on his mind..
He landed first at Durban, and then travelled to the annexed
Boer republics, in order to deal with the less complicated
issues in contention there, before becoming enmeshed in
the troubles of the Cape. Along the way, though he had
to make a daunting number of speeches, he listened intently,
not just to the great Boer assemblies at Pretoria and
Bloemfontein, but to individuals and small groups at every
train stop and to a stream of delegations at every city.
He listened with the practised ear of a man who had begun
his political career as spokesman for Britain's Noncon-
formists in their fight over elementary education. Con-
fronted with the sullen insistence of Dutch Reformed pre-
dikants on school? that would teach respect for their
friith in their tongue, he tutored Kilner on how to frame
concessions.
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Once he entered the zones of contention in the
Cape, his governing desire was to break through the ethnic
crust on "both sides. In the Eastern Cape, particularly
at Port Elizabeth, he sought to file down the aggressive,
self-interested edges of the protestations of loyalty
among the English communities. On the way to Cape Town,
he set up private interviews with ^pivotal Afrikaners,,
above all with the father of the Bond, Jan Hofmeyr..
Chamberlain persuaded them to take public .initiatives to
reconcile disaffected Afrikaners to imperial rule. Having
induced Hofmeyr to take the first step, he induced. Progres-
sive leaders to accept it at face value with equal publicity
as a signal to their followers. Admittedly there was,
as Miner sniffed, a theatrical quality to the performance.
Yet Hofmeyr entered into the exercise with careful con-
scientiousness, on the one hand risking a good deal of
Afrikaner disapproval for his public initiatives, on the
other hand pressing Chamberlain in sombre primacy for
a faster amnesty and more' generous treatment of the wartime
rebels. As Ghamberlain sailed home from Cape Town, his
chief concern was to sustain his dialogue with Hofmeyr
and, through him, to faster loyaTty among the Cax>e Dutch,
not to Britain, but to the broader Empire of which they
were part.
What might have come of Chamberlain's new policy
if it had been pursued is impossible to say. Perhaps
only he could sustain it. Certainly Milner would not..
While the disagreement between the two men never became
fully explicit, Milner wanted to retire. That prospect
filled Chamberlain with dismay, and he impressed everyone,
from the King down, with the cardinal importance of Milner1s
retention of office. His retirement, so Chamberlain feared,
would upset the English in South Africa,, and in that way
would unsettle their confidence in the cooperative order
that Chamberlain hoped to achieve.
For most of the preceding eight years, Chamberlain
had been preoccupied with South Africa. Over that time,
he had learned to curb his natural impetuosity, while
the impact of the war, particularly in the Cape,.had broa-
dened his popular sensitivities. Within three months of
his return from South Africa, something snapped within
him. When he launched his crusade for tariff reform or
imperial preference at the end of May, his vision, like
Gladstone's in 1886, narrowed to a single issue. He soon
talked of nothing else, as his children noted a little
sadly. At the end of September, he resigned as Secretary
of State for the Colonies in order to carry his crusade
to the country; and Milner, who would otherwise almost
certainly have retired from South Africa, stayed on..
However wide the ultimate ramifications of tariff reform
for the Empire as a whole, South Africa receded- for all
practical purposes to the back of Chamberlain's mind.
